

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF DOMINION ENERGY UTAH TO
INCREASE DISTRIBUTION RATES AND
CHARGES AND MAKE TARIFF
MODIFICATIONS

Docket No. 22-057-03

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF
AUSTIN C. SUMMERS
FOR
DOMINION ENERGY UTAH

October 13, 2022

DEU Exhibit 4.0R – Phase II

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1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 Q. Please state your name and business address.

3 A. Austin C. Summers, 333 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

4 Q. Did you file direct testimony in this docket?

5 A. Yes. I submitted direct testimony on behalf of Questar Gas Company dba Dominion
6 Energy Utah (“DEU”, “Dominion Energy” or “Company”).

7 Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony in this Docket?

8 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to address certain issues raised in the direct
9 testimonies filed by Mr. Abdulle, Mr. Daniel, Mr. Higgins, Mr. Mullins, and Mr. Collins
10 in this matter.

11 Q. What general areas does your testimony address?

12 A. My testimony explains why the cost-of-service and rate design proposals in my direct
13 testimony continue to be the best options proposed in this case. I address the proposed
14 changes to the allocation factors used in the class cost of service (“CCOS”) studies. I also
15 address the gradualism proposals made by Mr. Daniel, Mr. Abdulle, Mr. Higgins, and Mr.
16 Collins. With regard to rate design, I address the split of the current TS class, and the
17 volumetric rate proposals of Mr. Higgins.

18 Q. Based on the analysis and discussion of the items mentioned above, and addressed
19 below, are you proposing a change to the cost-of-service and rate design proposed in
20 this case?

21 A. No. My overall approach remains the same, but I do recommend two minor changes to my
22 approach. First, I recommend an adjustment to the allocation of LNG plant. This
23 adjustment is similar to what Mr. Higgins proposed, but is modified for accuracy as I
24 explain below. I also accept some minor rate adjustments proposed by Mr. Higgins. I also
25 indicate that a gradual approach to the proposed rate changes is reasonable. The parties in

26 this case have proposed varied methods and calculations for CCOS. However, with the
27 exception of the Utah Division of Public Utilities (“DPU”), which doesn’t represent a
28 particular class of customers, the other parties in this case have chosen a method that
29 directly benefits the specific customers of the class they represent. The Company does not
30 stand to gain financially as a result of the CCOS process and believes its CCOS proposal
31 is a fair compromise for all customer classes.

32 **II. COST-OF-SERVICE ALLOCATORS**

33 **A. *Design-Day Allocation Factor***

34 **Q. Do the other parties propose changes to the Design-Day Allocation Factor?**

35 A. Some did propose changes, while others accepted the Company’s proposal to continue the
36 Design Day Allocation Factor. Specifically, Mr. Abdulle and Mr. Daniel proposed some
37 form of peak-day calculation while the rest of the witnesses support the Company’s use of
38 design-day with no modifications to the calculations.

39 **Q. What changes do Mr. Abdulle and Mr. Daniel recommend to the Design-Day
40 allocation factor?**

41 A. Mr. Abdulle proposes a 3-year average of actual peak days because he claims that will
42 smooth out some variability from year to year. He states that a design-day rarely happens
43 and that, “It is useful for designing the system but inadequate for allocating costs according
44 to actual system *usage* and benefits.” Abdulle at lines 126-128 (emphasis added).

45 Mr. Daniel proposes to use the Peak-Day allocation factor that was included as DEU
46 Exhibit 4.06. This is the estimate that was developed during the task force in Docket No.
47 20-057-11. He states that “peak-day demand is more current and is a better representation
48 of how DEU’s system is actually being *used* by ratepayers.” Daniel at 161-163 (emphasis
49 added).

50 **Q. Should costs of a system be allocated based on how they are used or based on how**
51 **they are designed?**

52 A. With regard to those assets at issue, the Design-Day factor should be used. The cost
53 allocation under consideration includes costs associated with feeder line mains, compressor
54 stations, and measuring/regulation stations. The *costs* associated with these assets are the
55 costs to install them. When considering the principle of cost causation, consideration
56 should be given to why the asset cost what it did. These assets are designed and installed
57 to meet customer demand on a design day and therefore, the *costs* have design-day capacity
58 built into them.

59 **Q. Does “using” the system have any impact on the original cost of an asset?**

60 A. No. After an asset is installed, its cost and its designed purpose do not change. I’d like to
61 draw an analogy. Consider a person buying a new vehicle. The vehicle will be used most
62 days by that one person for a commute to work, but on weekends it will be used to drive
63 transport seven children to soccer games. The vehicle that is chosen needs to be “designed”
64 to seat the driver plus seven kids. As such, the *cost* of the vehicle will be the cost to
65 accommodate use by eight people, regardless of whether it’s driving one person every day
66 of the week, or eight people on a Saturday. Assume now that the owner is charging the
67 parents of the children to ride to practice. Using the Peak-Day allocation proposals by the
68 DPU and the OCS is like saying that, if children do not show up to practice, the parents
69 paying for the car do not need to pay the total original price of the car, even though the car
70 size was chosen to accommodate them. My proposal, on the other hand, assumes that seven
71 children may need a seat each week and, as such, a paid seat is there for them, even if a
72 child may miss a practice.

73 **Q. Are you giving any consideration to how these assets are used by customers outside**
74 **of a Design-Day?**

75 A. Yes. The costs of the assets I listed are not allocated on the Design-Day factor alone. In
76 fact, the Design-Day factor, by itself, is not used to allocate any assets or O&M expenses.
77 The Design-Day factor is combined with the Throughput factor so that these assets are

78 allocated using 60% Design-Day and 40% on how the system is *used* the rest of the year
79 (throughput). In the vehicle example above, including throughput (use of the system)
80 ensures that the person who is using the vehicle to commute every day still pays a portion
81 for the benefit of using it every day. This concept will be discussed in more detail later in
82 my testimony when I address the 60/40 weighting of Design-Day and Throughput, but to
83 reiterate the point, The Company's proposal *does consider* how customers are *using* the
84 system by blending the Throughput factor (how the system is used) with the Design-Day
85 factor (how the system was designed).

86 **Q. Why isn't the Peak-Day approach a good substitute for the Design-Day?**

87 A. In addition to those reasons set forth in my direct testimony, the Peak-Day is a poor
88 approach to allocating costs because it does not effectively match the causes of the costs
89 with those who are paying for them. Returning to my analogy, a vehicle can seat eight
90 people, even if it has only ever transported seven people. The *cost* of the vehicle is based
91 on the need to seat eight (Design-Day) so it should not be allocated based on a lower
92 number representing actual usage (Peak-Day). Design-Day is a better implementation of
93 the principle of cost causation.

94 **Q. Does the National Association of Regulated Utility Commissions ("NARUC") provide**
95 **an example of demand allocation set on Design-Day demand?**

96 A. Yes. NARUC's *Gas Distribution Rate Design Manual*, published in June of 1989, includes
97 a sample CCOS with a demand cost allocation factor that is derived from Design-Day
98 demand. As explained on page 31 of the manual: "The Peak Day Demand (Allocation
99 Factor 100) is the computed quantity of gas which would be supplied on a day when the
100 mean temperature of the utility's service territory is 5 degrees Fahrenheit (the coldest day
101 in 20 years for this particular system)..." It is noteworthy that NARUC itself
102 demonstrated a demand allocation using an estimated Design Day demand.

103 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Abdulle’s proposal to use a three-year average of peak-day to**
104 **increase consistency from one period to another?**

105 A. No. The calculation Mr. Abdulle proposes uses a time period of 2019-2021. Using the
106 average of those three years will certainly increase consistency for those three years, but it
107 will not necessarily be consistent from one rate case to another. The charts below show
108 the allocation of costs in this general rate case using a calculation of a Peak-Day from 2016-
109 2018 and another using Peak-Day data from 2019-2021. Comparing the GS class using
110 the two different time periods shows a difference of nearly \$8 million. This is not a large
111 change for the GS class, but the same \$8 million is also changed in the transportation
112 classes, where \$8 million makes a big difference in cost allocation. Utilizing Mr.
113 Abdullah’s approach creates significant inconsistency from one three-year period to the
114 next. When the allocator is based on a cold day instead of a design day, the allocation
115 factor will change depending on how cold the day actually is.

16-18 Avg Peak Day				19-21 Avg Peak Day			
Customer Class	Rev to be collected	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease	Customer Class	Rev to be collected	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	441,222,820	57,710,648	14.68%	GS	433,337,007	49,898,352	12.70%
FS	4,167,723	1,342,954	46.49%	FS	4,162,340	1,337,658	46.31%
IS	634,392	366,065	132.92%	IS	436,908	170,371	62.66%
TSS	10,510,120	(3,738,103)	-25.88%	TSS	12,284,514	(1,979,632)	-13.68%
TSM	16,059,568	2,082,838	14.64%	TSM	18,521,673	4,522,880	31.69%
TSL	20,358,480	9,112,013	79.06%	TSL	23,783,588	12,506,452	107.94%
TBF	4,597,439	(122,515)	-2.53%	TBF	5,045,971	319,125	6.57%
NGV	3,160,819	554,956	21.17%	NGV	3,139,360	533,651	20.36%
Total	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%	Total	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

116

117 **B. 60% Design Day 40% Throughput**

118 **Q. Will you explain the Design Day/Throughput Allocator?**

119 A. Yes. Dominion Energy filed this case using a blended allocator that was ordered in the
120 Company’s last general rate case. Specifically, the Company allocated 60% of the cost of
121 feeder lines and other core assets using a Design Day allocator, while the other 40% is
122 allocated using a normal throughput allocator. This 60/40 blend acknowledges that these
123 assets are used for both Peak-Day conditions, as well as normal throughput every day of
124 the year.

125 **Q. Did any of the intervening parties propose a different weighting of this factor?**

126 A. Yes. The intervening parties proposed a variety of Design Day/Throughput factor
127 weighting approaches, including ratios of 52/48, 54/46, 67.5/32.5, and 100/0. Each of these
128 approaches would produce vastly different cost allocation results.

129 **Q. Please summarize the positions of the other parties on this allocation factor.**

130 A. Mr. Higgins proposes to use the system load factor as an approximation for average
131 throughput. Since the system load factor is about 32.5%, he proposes that the allocator
132 change from 60 percent Design Day and 40 percent throughput to 67.5/32.5. This proposal
133 does shift some costs away from the large customers Mr. Higgins represents but it isn't as
134 severe as the proposal by Mr. Collins and Mr. Mullins. This proposal does address the fact
135 that large customers are using the system and should pay for some of the costs.

136 The comments by Mr. Collins and Mr. Mullins provide intriguing explanations of the
137 relationship between how a system is designed and the costs of the system. Mr. Collins
138 also included a good discussion regarding how the system benefits from having high load
139 factor customers. However, the proposal of allocating costs 100% on demand ignores the
140 fact that the high load factor customers are indeed using the system. This proposal would
141 place a lot of costs on residential customers and others with a low load factor.

142 Mr. Abdulle included several options in his testimony with a preference on a blended factor
143 of 54 percent Design Day/46 percent throughput that utilizes a different calculation of what
144 the system load factor is. Since he uses the coldest day of the year as a proxy for a Design
145 Day, his proposed allocation factor assigns more costs to industrial customers than the
146 Company's proposal would.

147 Mr. Daniel also proposed a blended factor based on using a Peak-Day input instead of the
148 Design-Day allocation factor proposed by the Company. This difference results in a
149 proposed weighting of 52 percent Design-Day/48 percent Throughput. Since more of the
150 costs are being allocated based on throughput, it places more costs on industrial customers,
151 relative to the Company's proposal.

152 **Q. What do the differences in these proposals show?**

153 A. A comparison of these options makes clear that the Company’s proposal is reasonable.
154 Three of the parties proposed a version of the “Average and Peak” method with drastically
155 different results. These results give weight to the reasonableness of the Company’s
156 proposal, which falls squarely between the results the other parties have proposed.

157 Of all the proposals, the one offered by Mr. Higgins carries the most analytical weight. Mr.
158 Higgins could have joined other witnesses in choosing a calculation that heavily favors the
159 large TS customers, but instead, he chose to offer a proposal in which he acknowledges
160 that the system is used to meet customer needs (including TS customer needs) on a design
161 day, and that customers with a high load factor are still using the system during the rest of
162 the year and should be allocated some costs for that use by including throughput in the
163 allocation. In this respect, I view his proposal as the most reasonable alternative to the
164 Company’s proposal.

165 **Q. Why are Lakeside volumes not included in the system load factor?**

166 A. Lakeside has a special contract with the Company. The Company excludes the volumes,
167 the revenue, and every other component of that contract from the cost allocation process.
168 It has done so because, including any of those components skews the costs that are being
169 allocated or the revenues that need to be collected from a group of customers.

170 **Q. How much difference does it make in the overall cost-of-service results when the
171 weighting options from other parties are used?**

172 A. The tables below were calculated using the revenue requirement provided as DEU Exhibit
173 3.36R in Mr. Stephenson’s rebuttal testimony. The tables show the COS results using the
174 Company’s proposal of the blended factor and the proposals of the other parties.

DEU 60% Design Day/40% Throughput

Customer Class	Allocation %	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	74.8%	439,428,952	55,950,096	14.24%
FS	1.2%	4,062,908	1,240,058	42.99%
IS	0.1%	243,188	(21,644)	-8.06%
TSS	4.3%	12,404,619	(1,862,311)	-12.86%
TSM	6.3%	16,718,806	2,733,962	19.19%
TSL	8.3%	18,353,209	7,123,470	61.98%
TBF	4.9%	6,376,958	1,628,240	33.21%
NGV	0.1%	3,122,722	516,985	19.72%
Total	100%	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

175

DPU (Abdulle) 54% Avg Peak Day/46% Throughput

Customer Class	Allocation %	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	72.2%	433,656,821	50,236,583	12.79%
FS	1.3%	4,259,564	1,434,422	49.64%
IS	0.1%	398,728	132,152	48.52%
TSS	4.2%	12,180,031	(2,084,726)	-14.40%
TSM	7.1%	18,318,025	4,314,802	30.20%
TSL	10.8%	23,331,869	12,045,784	103.71%
TBF	4.1%	5,438,002	707,329	14.55%
NGV	0.1%	3,128,321	522,513	19.93%
Total	100%	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

176

OCS (Daniel) 51.9% Peak Day/48.1% Throughput

Customer Class	Allocation %	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	71.6%	432,386,613	48,981,028	12.47%
FS	1.3%	4,267,865	1,442,639	49.92%
IS	0.1%	311,018	45,424	16.82%
TSS	4.3%	12,391,356	(1,875,739)	-12.95%
TSM	7.3%	18,723,955	4,716,238	32.99%
TSL	11.1%	23,984,207	12,690,900	109.11%
TBF	4.2%	5,514,329	782,196	16.08%
NGV	0.1%	3,132,019	526,171	20.07%
Total	100%	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

177

UAE (Higgins) 67.5% Design Day/32.5% Throughput

Customer Class	Allocation %	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	76.1%	441,893,108	58,386,167	14.85%
FS	1.2%	3,989,536	1,167,491	40.49%
IS	0.1%	219,465	(45,103)	-16.83%
TSS	4.3%	12,363,916	(1,902,600)	-13.14%
TSM	5.9%	16,059,460	2,081,895	14.63%
TSL	7.5%	16,808,799	5,596,167	48.84%
TBF	4.8%	6,269,675	1,523,006	31.09%
NGV	0.1%	3,107,403	501,835	19.15%
Total	100%	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

178

FEA & Nucor (Collins & Mullins) 100% Design Day/0% Throughput

Customer Class	Allocation %	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	81.5%	452,549,124	68,920,483	17.52%
FS	1.0%	3,672,281	853,722	29.68%
IS	0.0%	116,888	(146,539)	-55.15%
TSS	4.2%	12,187,955	(2,076,768)	-14.35%
TSM	4.5%	13,208,456	(737,570)	-5.21%
TSL	4.2%	10,130,717	(1,007,790)	-8.91%
TBF	4.4%	5,804,781	1,066,994	21.86%
NGV	0.1%	3,041,159	436,326	16.66%
Total	100%	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

179

180 **Q. Having reviewed all the parties’ proposals, what allocation factor do you**
181 **recommend?**

182 A. I recommend that the Company continue to use the 60 percent Design Day/ 40 percent
183 throughput ratio that the Utah Public Service Commission (“Commission”) ordered in
184 Docket No. 19-057-02. As I described above, most of the approaches have significant
185 shortcomings that result in unjust rates. While Mr. Higgins’ proposal is reasonable, there
186 is insufficient rationale to deviate from the methodology that the Company has been using.
187 Indeed, that methodology has effectively, and fairly, allocated costs to those customers
188 who cause them.

189 **C. Allocation of Large Diameter Mains**

190 **Q. How does the Company currently allocate large-diameter mains?**

191 A. As I described in lines 252-262 of my direct testimony, the Company uses the Distribution
192 Throughput factor to allocate large-diameter main lines.

193 **Q. Did other parties propose any changes to the allocation of large-diameter mains?**

194 A. Mr. Higgins and Mr. Collins both recommended some changes to the allocation of large-
195 diameter mains. Mr. Higgins proposes that these mains be allocated using the same
196 67.5/32.5 ratio of Design-Day/Throughput that he uses to allocate feeder lines. Mr. Collins
197 proposes that the distribution main lines and feeder lines be allocated based 100% on
198 demand.

199 **Q. Do these options result in a significant difference in the overall cost-of-service results?**

200 A. Yes. I calculated the tables below using the revenue requirement provided as DEU Exhibit
201 3.36R to Mr. Stephenson’s rebuttal testimony. The tables compare the COS results of the
202 Company’s proposal of allocating large diameter mains, with those resulting from Mr.
203 Higgins’ and Mr. Collins’ proposals.

DEU - Distribution Throughput

Customer Class	Allocation %	LD Mains	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	81.2%	100,916,899	439,428,952	55,950,096	14.24%
FS	1.8%	2,177,781	4,062,908	1,240,058	42.99%
IS	0.2%	238,763	243,188	(21,644)	-8.06%
TSS	5.5%	6,836,807	12,404,619	(1,862,311)	-12.86%
TSM	7.6%	9,441,360	16,718,806	2,733,962	19.19%
TSL	2.5%	3,106,440	18,353,209	7,123,470	61.98%
TBF	1.1%	1,362,972	6,376,958	1,628,240	33.21%
NGV	0.2%	261,541	3,122,722	516,985	19.72%
Total	100%	124,342,563	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

204

UAE (Higgins) - 67.5% Design Day/32.5% Throughput

Customer Class	Allocation %	LD Mains	Net Cost of Service		% Increase/Decrease
			Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/Decrease	
GS	76.1%	94,600,968	441,123,219	57,616,279	14.66%
FS	1.2%	1,460,170	3,878,685	1,056,640	36.66%
IS	0.1%	63,339	191,628	(72,939)	-27.24%
TSS	4.3%	5,357,492	12,141,314	(2,125,202)	-14.68%
TSM	5.9%	7,388,787	15,750,484	1,772,919	12.46%
TSL	7.5%	9,360,658	17,830,469	6,617,837	57.71%
TBF	4.8%	5,987,420	6,709,841	1,963,172	40.02%
NGV	0.1%	123,730	3,085,721	480,153	18.32%
Total	100%	124,342,563	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

205

FEA (Collins) - 100% Design Day/0% Throughput

Customer Class	Allocation %	LD Mains	Net Cost of Service		% Increase/Decrease
			Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/Decrease	
GS	81.5%	101,356,187	452,846,168	69,217,527	17.60%
FS	1.0%	1,266,706	3,529,716	711,156	24.74%
IS	0.0%	-	78,784	(184,643)	-69.58%
TSS	4.2%	5,257,951	11,947,757	(2,316,966)	-16.01%
TSM	4.5%	5,638,131	12,614,120	(1,331,905)	-9.40%
TSL	4.2%	5,246,195	10,483,948	(654,560)	-5.78%
TBF	4.4%	5,494,424	6,198,022	1,460,235	29.87%
NGV	0.1%	82,970	3,012,847	408,013	15.58%
Total	100%	124,342,563	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

206

207 **Q. Having reviewed all the parties' proposals, what allocation factor do you**
208 **recommend?**

209 **A.** As I discussed in lines 251-262 of my direct testimony, the Company's proposed use of the
210 Distribution Throughput Factor is superior. Nothing Mr. Higgins and Mr. Collins offer
211 suggest that their alternatives are better approaches. The Company has applied the
212 allocation of large diameter mains consistently using the distribution throughput for many
213 years. There is no compelling reason to change that now.

214 **D. General Plant Depreciation Allocation**

215 **Q. Please explain the general plant allocation factor proposed by Mr. Daniel?**

216 A. Mr. Daniel points out that the Company proposed to allocate depreciation expense for
217 general plant based on total gross plant. Mr. Daniel argues that general plant depreciation
218 should be based on a general plant allocation factor, not total gross plant. He states, “The
219 problem with using the total gross plant allocation factor is that general plant, and therefore,
220 general plant depreciation expenses, has no relationship to total gross plant.” Daniel
221 Direct, Lines 268-270.

222 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Daniel’s argument?**

223 A. No. Mr. Daniel’s proposal is misguided. Mr. Daniel’s use of the general plant allocation
224 factor is, in fact, heavily dependent on the very same gross plant factor he criticizes. Most
225 of the accounts Mr. Daniel uses are allocated using the gross plant factor. As a result, the
226 only difference between the gross plant factor proposed by the Company and Mr. Daniel’s
227 general plant factor is that Mr. Daniel’s calculation results in general plant costs being
228 assigned to the CNG stations, resulting in significant increases to the NGV class.

229 **Q. What is the result of changing this allocation factor?**

230 A. Using Mr. Daniel’s proposed allocation factor would shift \$889,876 to the NGV class. The
231 table below was calculated using the revenue requirement provided as DEU Exhibit 3.36R
232 from Mr. Stephenson’s rebuttal testimony. The tables compare the CCOS results of the
233 Company’s proposal and Mr. Daniel’s proposal. The Company’s original proposal to
234 allocate depreciation expense for general plant using the gross plant factor is consistent
235 with prior rate cases, and is still appropriate.

DEU -Gross Plant

Customer Class	Allocation %	General Depreciation Expense	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	87.67%	14,774,507	439,428,952	55,950,096	14.24%
FS	0.81%	136,891	4,062,908	1,240,058	42.99%
IS	0.04%	7,354	243,188	(21,644)	-8.06%
TSS	2.36%	398,020	12,404,619	(1,862,311)	-12.86%
TSM	3.30%	555,588	16,718,806	2,733,962	19.19%
TSL	3.60%	606,716	18,353,209	7,123,470	61.98%
TBF	2.16%	364,515	6,376,958	1,628,240	33.21%
NGV	0.05%	9,209	3,122,722	516,985	19.72%
Total	100.00%	16,852,800	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

236

OCS

Customer Class	Allocation %	General Depreciation Expense	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	83.04%	13,993,944	438,640,769	55,161,913	14.03%
FS	0.77%	129,659	4,055,563	1,232,714	42.73%
IS	0.04%	6,965	242,793	(22,038)	-8.21%
TSS	2.24%	376,991	12,383,198	(1,883,731)	-13.01%
TSM	3.12%	526,235	16,688,886	2,704,043	18.98%
TSL	3.41%	574,662	18,320,418	7,090,680	61.70%
TBF	2.05%	345,257	6,365,380	1,616,662	32.97%
NGV	5.33%	899,085	4,014,353	1,408,615	53.74%
Total	100.00%	16,852,800	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

237

238 **Q. What consequences would occur if the Company shifted these additional costs to the**
239 **NGV class?**

240 A. If the Commission accepts Mr. Daniel’s proposal, the NGV rate would increase from
241 \$10.77 to \$13.85. This increased price would further reduce demand for the stations, and
242 it would ultimately lead to circumstances where the Company would have to close stations.
243 As prices continue to rise and demand at the stations continues to decrease, some stations
244 would be uneconomical and the NGV class would cease to exist.

245 **Q. Would this have a negative effect on other rate classes?**

246 A. Yes. The NGV class helps to shoulder some of the general costs of the system and
247 eliminating this class from the system would ultimately shift those costs to other customers.

248 **Q. If the Commission determines that the allocation factor should be changed as**
249 **proposed by Mr. Daniel, what do you recommend?**

250 A. I recommend that the costs shifted to the NGV class be removed and be reallocated back
251 to the other classes.

252 **Q. Wouldn't this result in an NGV rate that is less than full cost of service?**

253 A. Yes, but *Utah Code 54-4-13.1. Natural gas vehicle rate – Natural gas clean air programs*
254 allows for this type of arrangement to encourage vehicle owners to use natural gas to fuel
255 their vehicles.

256 **Q. What is the language in this statute?**

257 A. Paragraph (1) of this statute states, “The commission may find that a gas corporation’s
258 request for a natural gas vehicle rate that is less than full cost of service is:

259 (a) in the public interest; and

260 (b) just and reasonable.”

261 Further, paragraph (2) of this section states, “If the commission approves a gas
262 corporation’s request under subsection (1), the remaining costs may be spread to other
263 customers of the gas corporation.” Utah Code Ann. §54-4-13.1

264 **Q. Would the NGV rate remain at full cost of service under the Company’s proposal?**

265 A. Yes. Under the Company’s cost of service allocation proposal, the NGV rate pays its full
266 cost of service. If the Commission rejects Mr. Daniels proposal, then the class will remain
267 at a full cost of service. If the Commission accepts Mr. Daniel’s proposal, then the
268 Company recommends that those costs previously allocated to the NGV class be allocated
269 back to the other classes and that the NGV rate be subsidized per Utah Code Ann. §54-4-
270 13.1 in order to preserve the NGV class.

271 **E. Distribution Depreciation**

272 **Q. Which parties discussed the depreciation of distribution assets?**

273 A. Mr. Mullins briefly recommends that “depreciation expenses be calculated for each FERC
274 plant account and allocated using the same allocation factor that is used for underlying
275 FERC Account.” Mullins at lines 288-289.

276 **Q. What is the result of changing this allocation factor?**

277 A. The table below were calculated using the revenue requirement provided as DEU Exhibit
278 3.36R from Mr. Stephenson’s rebuttal testimony. The tables show the CCOS results using
279 the Company’s proposal of allocating distribution depreciation and the proposal from Mr.
280 Mullins.

DEU -Distribution Gross Plant

Customer Class	Allocation %	Distribution Plant Depreciation Expense	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	87.48%	78,741,340	439,428,952	55,950,096	14.24%
FS	0.78%	706,401	4,062,908	1,240,058	42.99%
IS	0.04%	40,025	243,188	(21,644)	-8.06%
TSS	2.41%	2,166,329	12,404,619	(1,862,311)	-12.86%
TSM	3.36%	3,023,936	16,718,806	2,733,962	19.19%
TSL	3.67%	3,302,223	18,353,209	7,123,470	61.98%
TBF	2.20%	1,983,979	6,376,958	1,628,240	33.21%
NGV	0.05%	45,786	3,122,722	516,985	19.72%
Total	100.00%	90,010,020	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

281

Nucor - Allocation of Underlying Assets

Customer Class	Allocation %	Distribution Plant Depreciation Expense	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	90.39%	81,356,179	441,960,950	58,482,094	14.88%
FS	0.69%	617,737	3,972,644	1,149,795	39.86%
IS	0.02%	21,060	224,112	(40,719)	-15.17%
TSS	2.36%	2,126,492	12,359,614	(1,907,316)	-13.17%
TSM	2.69%	2,421,405	16,107,708	2,122,865	14.90%
TSL	1.92%	1,730,753	16,768,873	5,539,134	48.20%
TBF	1.89%	1,704,884	6,209,169	1,460,451	29.78%
NGV	0.04%	31,509	3,108,291	502,554	19.17%
Total	100.00%	90,010,020	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

282

283 **Q. Is Mr. Mullins' approach reasonable?**

284 A. Allocating the depreciation for the assets in the same manner as the underlying assets were
285 allocated could be justified. However, in the Company's proposal, it continues to use the
286 gross plant allocator. The gross plant allocation factor has been consistently used as a
287 reasonable allocation factor for distribution depreciation, is a reasonable allocation
288 methodology, and does not need to be changed.

289 *F. Costs of LNG Facility*

290 **Q. Mr. Higgins claims that the Company did not properly identify the costs of the LNG**
291 **facility so that these costs can be appropriately allocated. Is this correct?**

292 A. The Company properly identified the costs of the LNG facility, but some of the costs of
293 the facility discussed by Mr. Mendenhall were assets classified as main lines, meters, and
294 other appurtenant facilities. These other assets are booked in their respective FERC
295 accounts, not as part of the LNG facility. Table KCH-1 on line 267 of Mr. Higgins'
296 testimony shows that there was \$14,177,088 of gross plant that was not allocated to the
297 firm sales customers.

298 **Q. How did Mr. Higgins adjust for this difference in his model?**

299 A. Mr. Higgins increased the LNG-related rate base to be consistent with the amounts shown
300 in Table KCH-1, column (a). He also decreased the non-LNG distribution rate base by
301 reducing the amount of investment in account 378 – Measuring & Regulation Station
302 Equipment.

303 **Q. Is this the appropriate method to make this adjustment?**

304 A. The missing \$14,177,088 of appurtenant facilities was not in account 378, but rather was
305 spread between 16 other FERC accounts. DEU Exhibit 4.21R shows the other accounts
306 where LNG assets were closed to. Mr. Higgins' approach was in the right direction, but
307 he mistakenly failed to move investment from the correct accounts.

308 **Q. Was all of the \$14,177,088 allocated incorrectly?**

309 A. No. Though the costs were included in the totals of other FERC accounts, most of the costs
310 were still allocated to the GS and FS classes. Of the \$14,177,088, only \$2,240,846 was
311 allocated to classes outside of the firm sales classes.

312 **Q. Is the Company proposing to make an adjustment for the misclassified investment**
313 **amounts?**

314 A. Yes. DEU Exhibit 4.21R on the LNG Adjustment tab shows the calculations the Company
315 used to correctly assign this investment to the firm sales customers. This exhibit took the
316 investment in each account and determined how the total was allocated to each class using
317 the allocation factor originally proposed by the Company. The totals on line 21, rows G-
318 L were subtracted from the investment amount of each class and added to the GS and FS
319 classes. The result of these allocations is shown in DEU Exhibit 4.21R, on the “COS Detail
320 TS Split” tab, Excel line 989.

321 **Q. Do the amounts in account 364 (LNG Plant) and 364.1 (LNG Plant – Land) add up to**
322 **the \$218,063,414 shown in Mr. Mendenhall’s direct testimony?**

323 A. No. The appurtenant facilities are still in their respective FERC accounts, but the
324 adjustment described above ensures that costs are being allocated to the correct customers.

325 **Q. Mr. Higgins also mentions that the accumulated depreciation and ADIT for the LNG**
326 **facility was not allocated properly. Do you agree with his claim?**

327 A. As I mention above, the Gross Plant allocator is an appropriate way to allocate accumulated
328 depreciation. However, since the LNG facility is so unique and is intended only for specific
329 customers, it makes sense to use a different technique to allocate the depreciation
330 associated with that facility. The approach Mr. Higgins uses in UAE COS 2.3, pages 1 and

331 2 is an appropriate way to make this adjustment. Mr. Higgins' approach was used to
332 calculate the CCOS in DEU Exhibit 4.21R.

333 **G. Allocation of Design-Day Costs to Interruptible Customers**

334 **Q. Please summarize the positions of the intervening parties regarding the allocation of**
335 **design day costs to interruptible customers.**

336 A. Mr. Abdulle and Mr. Daniel both recommend that interruptible customers should be
337 charged for at least a portion of design-day costs. They reason that because interruptible
338 customers are rarely interrupted (even on cold days with high sendout), they should bear a
339 portion of the design-day costs. Mr. Higgins disagrees with this assertion and is aligned
340 with the Company's proposal.

341 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Abdulle and Mr. Daniel?**

342 A. No. Interruptible customers should not pay any design-day costs at all. The Company has
343 designed its system to meet the needs of its firm customers. Its system design, gas supply
344 and other planning all presume that interruptible customers will be interrupted on a design
345 day. Moreover, the Interruptible Sales (IS) class of customers is unique from all other
346 classes because those customers are *interruptible*. These customers would be subsidizing
347 costs for facilities to which they would have no access on a Design-Day. Allocating
348 Design-Day costs to interruptible customers would essentially eliminate any difference
349 between the IS class and a firm sales class. There would likely be no reason to have an
350 interruptible class at all. Additionally, if the Company were to interrupt these customers
351 and they failed to comply, they would be assessed penalties.

352 Also, NARUC has weighed in on this subject. On page 27 of its 1989 NARUC *Gas*
353 *Distribution Rate Design Manual*, it states: "Generally, interruptible customers would
354 receive no allocation of demand costs under this formula since they should be off the
355 system during the peak period."

356 **Q. Are any customers completely interruptible?**

357 A. There are a few, but most customers pay for at least a portion of their service to be firm.
358 In the IS class, 15 of the 18 customers also have firm service on either the GS or FS rate
359 schedule. In 2021, 23% of total IS demand was billed at a firm sales rate. In the TS class,
360 customers subscribe to firm service through a contracted daily demand and all the volumes
361 they use beyond that are considered to be interruptible. In 2021, 1,052 delivery points had
362 usage. Of those, 30 are 100% interruptible, 880 are 100% firm, and the remaining 142 use
363 both firm and interruptible volumes. Of the total TS volumes used in 2021, only 15% were
364 interruptible. These customers are already paying for a portion of demand costs through
365 the firm sales rate applied to their firm usage.

366 **Q. Does the application of Mr. Abdulle’s and Mr. Daniel’s recommendations make a**
367 **difference in the overall cost-of-service results?**

368 A. I calculated the tables below using the revenue requirement provided as DEU Exhibit
369 3.36R from Mr. Stephenson’s the rebuttal testimony. The tables show the CCOS results
370 of the Company’s proposal of allocating costs to interruptible customers, as well as the
371 results when using Mr. Abdulle’s and Mr. Daniel’s proposals.

DEU - Design Day

Customer Class	Allocation %	Design Day Dth	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	81.51%	1,189,838	439,428,952	55,950,096	14.24%
FS	1.02%	14,870	4,062,908	1,240,058	42.99%
IS	0.00%	-	243,188	(21,644)	-8.06%
TSS	4.23%	61,724	12,404,619	(1,862,311)	-12.86%
TSM	4.53%	66,187	16,718,806	2,733,962	19.19%
TSL	4.22%	61,586	18,353,209	7,123,470	61.98%
TBF	4.42%	64,500	6,376,958	1,628,240	33.21%
NGV	0.07%	974	3,122,722	516,985	19.72%
Total	100.00%	1,459,679	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

372

DPU (Abdulle) - Avg Peak

Customer Class	Allocation %	Avg Peak Day	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	78.53%	807,049	433,656,821	50,236,583	12.79%
FS	1.16%	11,871	4,259,564	1,434,422	49.64%
IS	0.13%	1,304	398,728	132,152	48.52%
TSS	4.02%	41,333	12,180,031	(2,084,726)	-14.40%
TSM	5.57%	57,271	18,318,025	4,314,802	30.20%
TSL	7.75%	79,608	23,331,869	12,045,784	103.71%
TBF	2.79%	28,690	5,438,002	707,329	14.55%
NGV	0.06%	631	3,128,321	522,513	19.93%
Total	100.00%	1,027,757	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

373

OCS (Daniel) - 25% IS

Customer Class	Allocation %	Peak Day Dth (25% IS)	Net Cost of Service Collected in Rates	\$ Increase/ Decrease	% Increase/ Decrease
GS	77.82%	766,846	432,386,613	48,981,028	12.47%
FS	1.15%	11,317	4,267,865	1,442,639	49.92%
IS	0.04%	406	311,018	45,424	16.82%
TSS	4.20%	41,430	12,391,356	(1,875,739)	-12.95%
TSM	5.83%	57,406	18,723,955	4,716,238	32.99%
TSL	8.10%	79,796	23,984,207	12,690,900	109.11%
TBF	2.80%	27,609	5,514,329	782,196	16.08%
NGV	0.06%	597	3,132,019	526,171	20.07%
Total	100.00%	985,405	500,711,361	67,308,857	15.16%

374

375 **Q. Applying Mr. Abdulle’s and Mr. Daniel’s proposals increase costs to the IS class by**
376 **\$153,795 and \$67,067 respectively. How would you characterize this increase?**

377 **A.** The reduction to GS customers is so small that it may not be noticeable. However, the
378 related cost increase to the IS class, which is a much smaller class, would be more
379 significant. In fact, making this change would reduce costs from other classes as well and
380 ultimately has an impact of \$155,541 (Mr. Abdulle’s proposal) or \$67,830 (Mr. Daniel’s
381 proposal) on the IS class revenue requirement. This increase in the IS class represents an
382 increase of 64% for Mr. Abdulle’s proposal and 27.89% for Mr. Daniel’s proposal. This
383 is a material subsidy of a service the class is not guaranteed. As Mr. Daniel noted in direct
384 testimony, customers in this class have been curtailed in the past, and these curtailments
385 did not occur under Design-Day conditions. These customers should not be paying for firm
386 service when they are clearly treated as interruptible.

387 *H. Gradualism*

388 **Q. Will you please summarize the positions of the other parties regarding gradualism?**

389 A. Yes. Most of the parties discusses gradualism as it relates to the current TS class and the
390 rate increases that were proposed by the Company. Mr. Abdulle did not propose anything
391 specific but did suggest that “If the Commission wishes to take a gradual approach with
392 changes within this [TS] class, it should implement that gradualism by adjusting the rates
393 of the subclasses in a manner that does not affect rates for the other classes.” Abdulle at
394 lines 328-331.

395 Mr. Daniel used the results of his CCOS study, which showed that the TBF class would
396 receive a 46% increase and used that as a cap that all classes would be held to. Daniel at
397 lines 631-634.

398 Mr. Higgins contends that the “Commission should consider implementing a rate
399 mitigation plan among the new TS classes that would limit the extent of any rate reduction
400 the TSS class while mitigating the increases on TSL and TSM.” Higgins at lines 356-358.

401 Mr. Collins suggested that no class of customers receive an increase more than 1.5 times
402 the system average increase. The system-wide increase will vary depending on the results
403 of the Revenue Requirement. Collins at Page 31, lines 15-16.

404 Finally, Mr. Mullins did not propose a gradualism approach since his CCOS results did not
405 show any increases to the transportation customers.

406 **Q. Is the Company willing to accept a new gradualism approach?**

407 A. Yes. As long as gradualism is not overly burdensome for the Company to administer,
408 recovers the correct revenue requirement, and results in rates that are reasonably fair, the
409 Company is open to gradualism.

410 **Q. What type of gradual approach would you consider to be administratively**
411 **burdensome?**

412 A. If the Commission decides the TS class should be split, that split should take effect
413 immediately. It would be burdensome to make gradual approaches to which customers are
414 in which class. Instead, the gradualism should be applied to the rates in the particular
415 classes.

416 **Q. Do any of the proposed gradualism approaches have flaws?**

417 A. Interestingly, none of the parties suggested a specific gradual approach that would end with
418 the three transportation classes paying full-cost rates. Rather, they propose that the
419 increases to any class be limited and have those costs spread to other classes of customers.
420 These are not gradual approaches to all customers paying full-cost rates. Rather they are,
421 as Mr. Higgins calls them, “rate mitigation strategies.”

422 **Q. Has the Company had problems with rates that are not full-cost in the past?**

423 A. Yes. The current TS class was not at full-cost rates until the end of 2021. This was a
424 highly-contested issue in each of the Company’s recent general rate cases. Dominion
425 Energy sees the value of reducing rate shock but prefers a plan that would ultimately have
426 each customer class paying full-cost rates. Choosing an approach that simply reduces the
427 rate impact to the TSL class could certainly make it more challenging to get that class to
428 full-cost rates later.

429 **Q. Does DEU have a proposal for gradualism?**

430 A. Dominion Energy believes that it has correctly and consistently allocated costs to each
431 class of customers and that those customers should be paying those costs as allocated. If
432 the Commission believes a rate increase for a particular group of customers is too much,
433 then DEU suggests that the Commission consider one of two options. First, the three-step
434 approach that was used in the last general rate case fit the criteria of moving a class to full-
435 cost gradually over time. A similar approach could be applied to the changes in the TS
436 class and would allow all classes of customers to *stay* at full cost. As a second option, if

437 the Commission believes there is too much cost being allocated to a particular class, the
438 Commission could consider some of the cost allocation options discussed by Mr. Higgins,
439 Mr. Collins, and Mr. Mullins. The Company believes that its own cost allocation approach
440 is appropriate, but the options proposed by these other parties have some logic and would
441 accomplish the objective of limiting the increase while still keeping rates of each class at
442 full-cost.

443 III. RATE DESIGN

444 A. *Splitting the TS Class*

445 **Q. Given the evidence in this case, do you think the TS class needs to be split?**

446 A. Yes. The evidence I introduced in my direct testimony shows that there are differences in
447 the costs to serve small TS customers and large TS customers. Splitting these customers
448 into three classes and performing the Company's CCOS studies shows that there are intra-
449 class subsidies in the existing TS class. The Company's CCOS proposal is consistent with
450 the CCOS allocations that are currently in effect and have been consistently used by the
451 Company for the last several rate cases. Though other parties have proposed CCOS studies
452 that give different results, they still show cost differences between the classes.

453 B. *Calculation of Volumetric Rates*

454 **Q. What does Mr. Higgins propose for the rate design in the IS, TSS, and TSL classes?**

455 A. Mr. Higgins shows that the Company's proposal for volumetric rates for these classes were
456 based on an absolute differential between each volumetric block. This means when the
457 overall revenue requirement is reduced, it can produce odd rates, sometimes even rates that
458 are negative. Mr. Higgins proposes that a "reduction in the class volumetric revenue
459 requirement compared to DEU's proposal be applied on an equal percentage basis to each
460 of DEU's proposed volumetric rates for the TSS, TSL, and IS classes." Higgins at lines
461 413-414.

462 **Q. Have you adopted Mr. Higgins’ proposal in your rate design for the IS, TSS, and TSL**
463 **classes?**

464 A. Yes. This is a reasonable approach that will result in reasonable rates. The rates calculated
465 in the rate design tab of DEU Exhibit 4.21R use this methodology.

466 **Q. What does Mr. Higgins propose for the rate design in the TBF class?**

467 A. Mr. Higgins proposes to link the TBF rates to the rates of the TSL class. He proposes that
468 the volumetric rates would “be calculated by applying an equal percentage discount to the
469 TSL volumetric rate for each block in order to achieve the targeted TBF volumetric revenue
470 requirement.” Higgins at lines 412-414.

471 **Q. Have you adopted Mr. Higgins’ proposal in your rate design for the TBF class?**

472 A. Yes. The customers in the TSL and TBF classes are very similar in terms of annual usage.
473 The only real difference is that the TBF customers are closer to an interstate pipeline and
474 could bypass the system. The TSL and TBF classes share the same block breaks, which is
475 another similarity. It is important to note that the Company’s CCOS studies did calculate
476 a revenue requirement specifically for the customers in the TBF class so the rates that are
477 set need to collect that revenue requirement. Mr. Higgins’ proposal accomplishes that
478 objective and links the two similar classes. Therefore, the calculation of TBF rates in the
479 Rate Design tab of DEU Exhibit 4.21R are based on Mr. Higgins’ proposal.

480 **IV. OTHER ISSUES**

481 **A. *Typical Bill Options for GS class***

482 **Q. Mr. Abdulle proposes that the Company should do a typical bill calculation for GS**
483 **customers of different sizes in future filings. Is this necessary?**

484 A. It is not necessary. This doesn’t affect the calculation of rates or the collection of revenue.
485 The information that is provided in every filing is for comparison purposes only and using
486 the median customer captures a large majority of customers in the GS class. The Company
487 is willing to include them in future filings and has no preference of the DPU’s proposals.

488

B. Electronic Model

489 **Q. Have you included a new model with your changes to cost of service and rate design?**

490 A. Yes. Attached as DEU Exhibit 4.21R is a copy of the model filed by Jordan Stephenson
491 in his rebuttal testimony as DEU Exhibit 3.36R. This model shows the Company's revenue
492 requirement calculated by Mr. Stephenson and the Company's proposed cost of service
493 and rate design with the following changes.

494 1. Cost-of-Service – Accepted Mr. Higgins' proposal (with modifications explained above)
495 to make changes to the allocation of LNG plant, accumulated depreciation, and
496 accumulated deferred income taxes (ADIT).

497 2. Rate Design – Accepted Mr. Higgins' proposals for volumetric rates in the IS, TSS, TSL,
498 and TBF classes

499 Though the Company is not accepting the proposals from other parties that are listed below,
500 the Company has included these allocation factors in DEU Exhibit 4.21R. The Company
501 is willing to help any party change an allocation factor in the model upon request.

502 1. Mr. Higgins proposal to change the weighted allocation factor from 60/40 to 67.5/32.5

503 2. Mr. Abdulle's proposal to change the weighted allocation factor from 60/40 to 54/46

504 3. Mr. Daniel's proposal to change the weighted allocation factor from 60/40 to 52/48

505 4. Mr. Collins' and Mr. Mullins' proposal to change the weighted allocation factor from
506 60/40 to 100/0

507 5. Mr. Collins' and Mr. Mullins' proposal to change the allocation of large-diameter mains
508 from distribution throughput to 100% design-day

509 6. Mr. Higgins' proposal to change the allocation of large-diameter mains from distribution
510 throughput to a weighted design-day/average throughput factor of 67.5/32.5

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF
AUSTIN C. SUMMERS

511 7. Mr. Daniel’s proposal to change the allocation of general plant depreciation expenses
512 from gross plant to his weighted factor between gross plant and tools, shop and garage
513 equipment


514 8. Mr. Mullins’ proposal to change the allocation of distribution plant depreciation from
515 gross plant to a method that allocates based on the underlying asset allocation.

516 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

517 A. Yes.

State of Utah)
) ss.
County of Salt Lake)

I, Austin C. Summers, being first duly sworn on oath, state that the answers in the foregoing written testimony are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Except as stated in the testimony, the exhibits attached to the testimony were prepared by me or under my direction and supervision, and they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Any exhibits not prepared by me or under my direction and supervision are true and correct copies of the documents they purport to be.


Austin C. Summers

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO this 13th day of October, 2022.


Notary Public

