

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

IN THE MATTER OF THE)
APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY)
WATER COMPANY FOR APPROVAL)
OF GENERAL RATE INCREASE AND)
SPECIAL CHARGE FOR MAJOR PLANT)
UPGRADE/REPAIR.)
)

DOCKET NO. 17-098-01

DPU Exhibit 3.0 DIR

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF

CASEY J. COLEMAN

DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
STATE OF UTAH

February 13, 2018

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19 A. No. However, the ratemaking principles I apply in telephone cases and address in this
20 testimony are applicable to water cases.

21 **II. SUMMARY**

22 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE AND DESCRIBE THE PURPOSE OF YOUR**
23 **TESTIMONY.**

24 A. On September 14, 2017 Community Water Company LLC. (“Community”) filed In the
25 Matter of the Application of Community Water Company for Approval of General Rate
26 Increase and Special Charge for Major Plant Upgrade/Repair (“Application”) in Docket
27 No. 17-098-01 This Application requests that the Public Service Commission of Utah
28 (“Commission”) grant a general rate increase and a special charge for major plant
29 upgrade/repair. The Application also sought an interim rate increase and a special fee.
30 On October 30, 2017 the Commission denied the interim rates.

31 The purpose of my testimony is to recommend an appropriate capital structure, with an
32 overall rate of return, and return on equity that Community should be allowed the
33 opportunity to earn.

34 **III. PRINCIPLES OF RATE REGULATION AND FAIR RATE OF RETURN**

35 **Q. WHAT ARE THE DIVISION’S RECOMMENDED OVERALL RATE OF**
36 **RETURN, RETURN ON EQUITY, AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE FOR**
37 **COMMUNITY?**

38 A. The Division recommends Community be permitted an overall rate of return of 7.15

39 percent, including a 10.22 percent cost of common equity, based upon a hypothetical
40 capital structure. The Division's recommendation reflects Community's unique risk
41 characteristics.

42 **Q. WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING FAIR RATES OF RETURN IN THE**
43 **CONTEXT OF RATE REGULATION?**

44 A. In a market system, competition generally determines the price for goods and services.
45 Public utilities are permitted to operate as monopolies or near monopolies because: (1)
46 the services provided by utilities are considered necessities by society; and (2) capital-
47 intensive and long-lived facilities are necessary to provide utility service and the
48 construction of multiple, competitive networks of facilities would cost customers more.
49 Generally, utilities are required to serve all customers in their service territory at
50 reasonable rates determined by regulators. As a result, regulators act as something of a
51 substitute for a competitive free-market system when they authorize prices for utility
52 service.

53 Although utilities operate in varying degrees as regulated monopolies, they must
54 compete with governmental bodies, non-regulated industries, and other utilities for
55 labor, materials, and capital. Capital is provided by investors who seek the highest
56 return commensurate with the perceived level of risk; the greater the perceived risk, the
57 higher the required return rate. In order for utilities to attract the capital required to
58 provide service, a fair rate of return should equal an investor required, market-
59 determined rate of return.

60 **Q. WHAT CONSTITUTES A FAIR RATE OF RETURN?**

61 A. Two noted Supreme Court cases define the benchmarks of fair rate of return. In
62 *Bluefield*¹ a fair rate of return is defined as: (1) equal to the return on investments in
63 other business undertakings with the same level of risks (the comparable earnings
64 standard); (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of a utility (the
65 financial integrity standard); (3) adequate to permit a public utility to maintain and
66 support its credit rating, enabling the utility to raise or attract additional capital
67 necessary to provide reliable service (the capital attraction standard). The second case,
68 *Hope*² determined a fair rate of return to be based upon guidelines found in *Bluefield* as
69 well as stating that: (1) allowed revenues must cover capital costs including service on
70 debt and dividends on stock; and (2) the Federal Power Commission was not bound to
71 use any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates. Utilities are
72 not entitled to a guaranteed return. However, the regulatory-determined price for
73 service must allow the utility a fair opportunity to recover all costs associated with
74 providing service, including a fair rate of return.

75 **IV. COMPARABLE GROUP**

76 **Q. HOW DO YOU ESTIMATE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY FOR**
77 **COMMUNITY?**

¹ *Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Company v P.S.C. of West Virginia*, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).

² *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company*, 320 U.S. 591, 602-603, (1944).

78 A. Because Community is a privately held company with no shares of stock traded
79 publicly, there is no specific stock information available for Community. As a result, I
80 used a comparable group of utility companies with actively traded stock, to determine a
81 market-required cost of common equity capital for Community. Since it is almost
82 impossible to find publicly traded companies similar to Community, it is reasonable to
83 determine the market-required cost rate for a comparable group of utility companies
84 and adjust, to the extent necessary, for investment risk differences between Community
85 and the comparable group.

86 **Q. HOW DID YOU SELECT THE COMPARABLE GROUP USED TO**
87 **DETERMINE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY FOR COMMUNITY?**

88 A. A comparable group of water utilities was selected to determine the cost of common
89 equity for Community. As discussed later in my testimony, there are some differences
90 and similarities with the companies selected. All of the companies are much larger
91 than Community so there are some significant size differences yet because the
92 companies are regulated water utilities there are some similar characteristics that can be
93 used for analysis. The following items are the criteria used to filter the water
94 companies, which includes: (i) covered by security analysts, (ii) contained in The Value
95 Line Investment Survey, (iii) have stock that is publicly-traded, (iv) have financial
96 information for 2017, and (v) are not currently the target of an announced merger or
97 acquisition. I removed Consolidated Water Company, Ltd. because it is domiciled in
98 the Cayman Islands; its operations are in the Cayman Islands, Belize, Bahamas, British

99 Virgin Islands and Bali; it provides desalination seawater to its customers; and it has
100 significant non-regulated business. The companies in the proxy group are identified on
101 Exhibit 3.1. I will refer to these companies as the “Water Group” throughout my
102 testimony.

103 **V. CAPITAL STRUCTURE**

104 **Q. WHAT IS REQUIRED TO DEVELOP AN OVERALL RATE OF RETURN FOR**
105 **A PUBLIC UTILITY?**

106 A. The first step in developing an overall rate of return is the selection of capital structure
107 ratios to be employed. Next the cost rate for each capital component is determined.
108 The overall rate of return is the product of weighting each capital component by its
109 respective capital cost rate. This procedure results in Community’s overall rate of
110 return being weighted properly to reflect the amount of capital and cost of capital for
111 each type of capital.

112 **Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIO IS APPROPRIATE TO BE USED TO**
113 **DEVELOP COMMUNITY’S OVERALL RATE OF RETURN?**

114 A. The Division recommends using a hypothetical capital structure of 45 percent debt and
115 55 percent equity.

116 **Q. IS THERE A SET OF REGULATORY AND FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES USED**
117 **IN DECIDING THE APPROPRIATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE TO USE FOR**
118 **COST OF CAPITAL PURPOSES?**

119 A. Yes. There is a general set of regulatory and financial principles used in deciding the
120 capital structure issue for cost of capital purposes that are consistent with both
121 regulatory and financial theories:³

122 1. It is generally preferable to use a utility's actual capital structure in developing its
123 rate of return. However, in deciding whether a departure from this general
124 preference is warranted in a particular case, it is appropriate to first look to the
125 issue of whether the utility is a financially independent entity.⁴ In determining
126 whether a utility is a financially independent entity or self-financing, it is
127 important to look to whether the utility:

- 128 • Has its own bond rating;
- 129 • Provides its own debt financing; and
- 130 • Debt financing is not guaranteed by a parent company.

131 2. When a utility issues its own debt that is not guaranteed by the public or private
132 parent and has its own bond rating, regulatory and financial principles indicate to
133 use a utility's own capital structure, unless the utility's capital structure is not
134 representative of the utility's risk profile or where use of the actual capital structure
135 would create atypical results. Regulatory and financial principles involve
136 determining whether the actual capital structure is atypical when compared with the

³ See generally Roger A. Morin Ph.D., *Utilities Cost of Capital* 14-18 (1984).

⁴ See generally *Fundamentals of Financial Management*, 7th Edition, chapter 5, 8, 9, and 12.

137 capital structure approved by the Commission for other utilities that operate in the
138 same industry (i.e., water utility, gas distribution utility, telecommunications
139 company, etc.), as well as those of proxy utility companies that operate in the same
140 industry.⁵

141 3. If a utility does not provide its own financing, public utility commissions often look
142 to another entity. Generally, public utility commissions use the actual capital
143 structure of the entity that does the financing for the regulated utility as long as it
144 results in just and reasonable rates. This generally means using a parent company.

145 Once the cost of equity for the proxy companies is determined, public utility
146 commissions should determine where to set the utility's return based upon how the
147 utility's risk compares with that of other utilities that operate in the same industry (i.e.
148 water utility, gas distribution utility, etc.). The risk analysis begins with the assumption
149 that the utility generally falls within a broad range of average risk, absent highly
150 unusual circumstances that indicate an inconsistently high or low risk as compared to
151 other utilities that operate in the same industry. Generally, financial risk is the function
152 of the amount of debt in an entity's capital structure used for the cost of capital
153 purposes. When there is more debt, there is more risk.⁶

⁵ For a comprehensive overview of the regulatory process and the issues involved, see Howe, K.M. and Rasmussen, E.F. *Public Utility Economics and Finance*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., (1982)

⁶ See generally Kahn, Alfred E. *The Economics of Regulation Principles and Institutions Volume 1 and Volume II*, The MIT Press (1988).

154 **Q. CAN YOU DISCUSS HOW COMMUNITY FITS INTO THE FINANCIAL**
155 **PRINCIPLES OUTLINED ABOVE?**

156 A. Yes. From the information we have Community is wholly owned by TCFC Finance Co
157 LLC (“TCFC”).⁷ Even though Community is wholly owned by TCFC, Community is
158 in the process of obtaining debt independent of the parent company.⁸ Using these
159 guiding principles, it would seem reasonable at first glance to use the actual capital
160 structure of Community in this proceeding.

161 Unfortunately, there are other elements of the capital structure of Community that do
162 not fit as nicely into the general financial principles. First, Community does not have a
163 bond rating for its debt. Second, if Community is able to obtain the debt financing, its
164 capital structure would be over 90 percent debt. As Exhibit 3.1 shows, a highly
165 leveraged water utility with 90 percent debt is an atypical capital structure.
166 Additionally, a 90 percent debt capital structure would be an unhealthy capital structure
167 for any regulated utility over the long term.

168 VI. HYPOTHETICAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE

169 **Q. IF GENERAL REGULATORY AND FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES FAVOR**
170 **USING THE ACTUAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A COMPANY, WHY IS**
171 **THE DIVISION RECOMMENDING USING A HYPOTHETICAL CAPITAL**
172 **STRUCTURE?**

⁷ Proprietary Exhibit A. 5-Ownership and Officers filed by Community Water in Docket No. 17-098-01.

⁸ Supplemental Direct Testimony of Larry White for Community Water Docket No. 17-098-01.

173 A. Because Community does not have a bond rating, its actual capital structure is highly
174 irregular from market norms, and its actual capital structure is not reflective of
175 Community's risk profile, the Commission should use a hypothetical capital structure
176 of 55 percent equity and 45 percent debt.

177 **Q. WHY IS IT REASONABLE TO USE A HYPOTHETICAL CAPITAL**
178 **STRUCTURE?**

179 A. This question was detailed by Roger Morin ⁹ as follows:

180 "The relationship between capital structure and the cost of capital is developed
181 graphically in Table 1. The horizontal axis is the debt ratio, Debt/Capital
182 assuming no other form of senior capital exists. The graph depicts the return
183 requirements of bondholders and shareholders in response to a change in capital
184 structure as the firm progressively substitutes debt for equity capital.


185 The required return on debt is relatively flat from a debt ratio of zero up to a
186 critical debt ratio value, say of 50%. Beyond that point, an increase in debt ratio
187 has an upward influence on bond returns as debt holders perceive a significant
188 increase in financial risk. Any reduction in debt ratio below the critical point
189 would not yield significant reductions in interest costs. The security of the
190 bondholders' investment is not substantially improved by additional reductions
191 in the debt ratio. Beyond the critical point, bond returns increase in a manner
192 consistent with the quality gradient observed for utility bond yields and debt
193 ratios. As the bond yield curve moves upward, this upward trend reflects the
194 relationship of increased risk for bond holders. This upward trend correlates to
195 the actual bond yields for electric utilities rated AAA, AA, A, and BAA at a
196 moment in time. Access to debt financing is likely to be severely curbed
197 beyond the BAA bond rating.

198 The curve depicting the behavior for shareholders as the debt ratio is increased
199 is developed as follows. At a zero debt ratio, the return on equity coincides
200 with the return on total capital since the firm is all-equity financed at that point.
201 Beyond that point, with each successive increase in the debt ratio, equity returns

⁹ Roger A. Morin Ph.D., Utilities Cost of Capital 268-269 (1984)

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rise moderately at first in response to increasing financial risk to the point where bond ratings begin to deteriorate. As the debt ratio reaches dangerous levels



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where the solvency of the firm is endangered, shareholders required returns rise sharply.

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The relationship between the average cost of capital and capital structure emerges directly from the assumed behavior of bond returns and equity returns. This is also shown above in Table 1. At zero debt ratio, the cost of capital is coincident with the cost of equity. With each successive substitution of low-cost debt for high-cost equity, the average cost of capital declines as the weight of low-cost debt in the average increases. A low point is reached where the cost advantage of debt is exactly offset by the increased cost of equity. Beyond that point, the cost disadvantage of equity outweighs the cost advantage of debt, and the weighted cost of capital rises accordingly.

215 The most salient characteristic of the graph is the U-shaped nature of the cost of
216 capital curve, pointing to the existence of an optimal capital structure whereby
217 the cost of capital is minimized. Despite the rise of both debt and equity costs
218 with increases in the debt ratio, the weighted average cost of capital reaches a
219 minimum. Beyond this point the low-cost and tax advantages of debt are
220 outweighed by the increased equity costs. This occurs just before the point
221 where bond ratings start deteriorating, and the cost of capital increases rapidly
222 at higher debt ratios.

223 Utilities should strive for a capital structure which minimizes the composite
224 capital cost, including taxes. Hypothetical capital structures are sometimes used
225 by regulatory commissions to determine a fair allowed return if a utility is
226 deemed to have **deviated significantly from the optimum**. A hypothetical
227 capital structure may lower the cost of capital, which in turn may translate into
228 lower rates for consumers as long as by using more debt, the cost and tax
229 benefits of debt outweigh the increased equity costs.”

230 As outlined above, commissions have used a hypothetical capital structure to determine
231 a fair allowed rate of return if a utility has deviated significantly from the optimum. By
232 using a hypothetical capital structure the Commission would be approximating an
233 optimal capital structure that lowers the total capital costs to a company while still
234 meeting the guidelines necessary in utility rate making. Setting a capital structure as
235 close to the optimal capital structure is balancing both the needs of rate payers and
236 investors of the utility. A lower capital cost translates into lower water rates for
237 customers.

238 Choosing to use an actual capital structure for Community would be an unreasonable
239 decision because it would not accurately reflect the risk profile of the company and
240 would decrease the allowed rates to a level where Community would be exposed to a
241 high level of financial risk.

242 **Q. HOW DID THE DIVISION DETERMINE A REASONABLE CAPITAL**
243 **STRUCTURE FOR COMMUNITY?**

244 A. The Division determined an average capital structure from the Water Group companies.
245 As exhibit 3.1 shows, the Division compiled the debt and equity ratios for each of the
246 eight companies. The ratios were calculated by Value Line and included information
247 for 2017, 2018, and future years. Using the average of the Water Group, the Division
248 calculated a ratio of 55.1 percent equity and 44.9 percent debt in 2017, 54.4 percent
249 equity and 45.6 percent debt for 2018, and future ratios of 54.5 percent equity and 45.5
250 percent debt. The trend over that time period does not seem to shift significantly;
251 therefore for simplicity the Division used whole numbers close to the 2017 averages of
252 55 percent equity and 45 percent debt.

253 **Q. WHY ARE THE WATER COMPANIES AN ACCEPTABLE PROXY FOR**
254 **COMMUNITY?**

255 A. There are many characteristics of the Water Group that would be similar to
256 Community. Most importantly, they are water companies who are in the same industry
257 as Community. Because of this they would have some of the same business risks as
258 Community. Additionally, because they are larger companies, they would be more
259 likely to use both debt and equity in the financing of their utility operations. This
260 illustrates the capital structure companies may use when financial decisions must be
261 made with a mix of debt and equity. Finally, because each company is a regulated

262 utility, its rate making philosophies would generally fall under general regulatory
263 principles.

264 **VII. COST OF CAPITAL**

265 **Q. WHAT IS THE ALLOWED RATE OF RETURN THE DIVISION IS**
266 **RECOMMENDING FOR COMMUNITY?**

267 A. As Exhibit 3.2 illustrates, the Division recommends using an allowed rate-of-return of
268 7.15 percent.

269 **Q. EXPLAIN HOW THE DIVISION CALCULATED THE ALLOWED RATE-OF-**
270 **RETURN FOR COMMUNITY.**

271 A. The Division used a weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) for Community. The
272 debt portion of the calculation was 3.39 percent, the actual cost of the debt Community
273 will get from the State of Utah Division of Drinking Water. The cost of equity for
274 Community is 10.22. Using the hypothetical capital structure recommended by the
275 Division, and the above inputs, the WACC is 7.15 percent.

276 **Q. HOW DID THE DIVISION DETERMINE A COST OF EQUITY OF 10.22**
277 **PERCENT?**

278 A. The Division used a Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), which is a model based on
279 the proposition that any stock’s required rate of return is equal to the risk-free-rate of
280 return plus a risk premium reflecting only the risk remaining after diversification.
281 Generally, if parties know the risk premium, the risk-free-rate and beta, a rate of return
282 can be calculated. In CAPM terminology, beta is a measure of the extent to which the

283 returns on a given stock move with the stock market. The ideal scenario is to calculate a
284 beta specific to an individual stock or company based on a variety of different financial
285 information. With small water companies, the information needed is not publicly
286 available, making a specific beta calculation for Community or any small water company
287 challenging. To determine an approximate beta that could apply to Community, the
288 Division looked the Water Group of companies with financial information that could be
289 used to calculate a beta. With this calculated beta and following the general guidelines of
290 CAPM the Division was able to calculate, as reflected in Exhibit 3.3, the cost of equity
291 for Community at 10.22 percent.

292 **Q. IT APPEARS FROM THE CAPM CALCULATION THE COST OF EQUITY**
293 **WOULD BE 7.22 PERCENT. WHY IS THE DIVISION RECOMMENDING AN**
294 **ADJUSTMENT OF 3 PERCENT?**

295 A. As a general financial principle the market risk and financial risk to a company increases
296 with the smaller the size of the company. As Exhibit 3.4 illustrates, Community is
297 drastically smaller than the Water Group. To get a sense of the actual size difference, the
298 Division looked at number of customers an annual revenues. Community has 498
299 customers and annual revenues of \$217,754. The average number of customers of the
300 Water Group companies is 2.1M with average revenues of \$723.4M. Using these
301 calculations, the Division determined the Water Group is 4,333 times bigger than
302 Community when looking at customer size and 3,322 times bigger when comparing
303 annual revenues. Because of such a significant size difference between Community and

304 the Water Group the Division recommends an adjustment in the cost of capital of three
305 percent to reflect the additional risk of a small water company as will be discussed later
306 in my testimony. This additional adjustment recommended by the Division allows the
307 Cost of Equity and WACC to fall within the range of rates recommended by Duff and
308 Phelps in its Industry Cost Calculations for 2017.

309 **Q. WHY IS THE DIVISION USING ONLY A CAPM APPROACH INSTEAD OF**
310 **OTHER FINANCIAL MODELS TO DETERMINE THE COST OF CAPITAL?**

311 A. Professor Brigham¹⁰ discusses the three cost-estimating techniques, Discounted Cash
312 Flow, Bond-Yield-Plus-Risk-Premium, and CAPM, when evaluating small companies
313 and problems inherent in each method. He states:

314 [E]ach have serious limitations when applied to small firms. With a constant
315 growth model, a small, rapidly growing firm may choose to not have a dividend
316 and will not pay one in the foreseeable future. For firms like this a constant
317 growth model is simply not applicable.

318 Professor Brigham continues:

319 In fact, it is difficult to imagine any dividend model that would be of practical
320 benefit for such a firm because of the difficulty of estimating dividends and
321 growth rates.

322 The second method, which calls for adding a risk premium. . . to the firm's cost
323 of debt, can be used for some small firms, but problems arise if the firm does
324 not have a bond issue outstanding.

325 The third approach, the CAPM, is often not usable because if the firms' stock is
326 not publicly traded, then we cannot calculate its beta. For the privately owned
327 firm, we might use the 'pure play' CAPM technique, which involves finding a
328 publicly owned firm in the same line of business, estimating that firm's beta,

¹⁰ See Fundamentals of Financial Management, 7th Edition, page 316.

329 and then using that beta as a replacement for the one of the small business in
330 question.

331 Because Community is a small water company with no publicly traded stock, the only
332 approach that could provide reasonable results is the CAPM approach using proxy
333 companies. Because of this, the Division used the CAPM financial model and did not
334 attempt to calculate a cost of capital using other methods.

335 **VIII. ADDITIONAL COST OF CAPITAL ANALYSIS**

336 **Q. IS THE DIVISION COMFORTABLE WITH THE RESULTS?**

337 A. Yes, with some qualifications. The CAPM model can have some inherent weaknesses
338 that can impact the cost of equity calculation. At any given time, a particular model may
339 understate or overstate the cost of equity. Because of this reality, the Division has
340 considered other data points to see if the results recommended are within the range of
341 reasonableness for a fair market return. As demonstrated with comparable water
342 companies, investor owned utilities in Utah, and market rates calculated by Duff and
343 Phelps, the Division's recommendations are reasonable. Because of the analysis done, the
344 Division is comfortable recommending the Commission use 7.15 percent allowed rate-of-
345 return for Community in this Docket.

346 **Q. EXPLAIN HOW THE DIVISION USED DATA FROM COMPARABLE**
347 **WATER COMPANIES TO ADJUST THE COST OF EQUITY FOR**
348 **COMMUNITY.**

349 A. As detailed in Exhibit 3.5, the Division examined pending water utility rate cases where
350 the total rate increase was over \$500,000. Data from this analysis was compiled from
351 *S&P Global Market Intelligence Water Advisory: Monthly Report* dated January 4, 2018.

352 The figures show for the companies reviewed a cost of equity from a low of 9.25 percent
353 to a high of 11 percent. The Division's recommendation for Community's cost of capital
354 is within the range of other water companies, making the Division comfortable with the
355 adjustment proposed.

356 **Q. EXPLAIN HOW YOU USED DATA FROM INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES**
357 **IN UTAH TO ADJUST THE COST OF EQUITY FOR COMMUNITY.**

358 A. Another set of data reviewed by the Division to see if the proposed adjustment is
359 reasonable was considering the last general rate cases for Rocky Mountain Power
360 ("RMP") and Dominion Energy Utah, ("DEU"), the two largest investor owned utilities
361 in the state of Utah. In RMP's last rate case in Docket No 13-035-184 the Commission
362 approved a 9.8 percent cost of equity for the company and a WACC of 7.585 percent. In
363 Docket No 13-057-05 DEU had a 9.85 cost of equity and a WACC of 7.64 percent.

364 Looking at the size and scope of both utilities it is obvious that Community is much
365 smaller than either company. Because of this obvious fact, the Division is comfortable
366 suggesting less than a 50 basis point adjustment over the allowed cost of equity for both
367 RMP and DEU. Adding this adjustment seems a reasonable approach to compensate for
368 the size differences and market risk Community would face as a small water company.

369 **Q. EXPLAIN HOW YOU USED DATA FROM DUFF AND PHELPS TO ADJUST**
370 **THE COST OF EQUITY FOR COMMUNITY.**

371 A. Duff and Phelps is the premier global valuation and corporate finance advisor. Each year
372 Duff and Phelps author five books that focus on the U.S. and international valuation

373 theory, data, and risk premiums (e.g. equity risk premiums, risk-free rates, size
374 premiums, industry risk premiums, betas, industry multiples, and other statistics, etc.) for
375 use in valuation models. Exhibit 3.6 provides the calculations for the Water Supply group
376 as calculated by Duff and Phelps. When looking at the CAPM Risk Premium Report for
377 Water Supply, Duff and Phelps recommends a median range of 8.9 percent to 14.4
378 percent. The 10.22 percent the Division is recommending is well within the range
379 suggested by Duff and Phelps.

380 Another interesting data point to consider from the Duff and Phelps report is the range for
381 the WACC of Water Supply companies. On the low side of the range, Duff and Phelps
382 suggest a WACC of 5.5 percent going to the high end of the range which is 9.9 percent.
383 An average water company is 6.7 percent. The Division is recommending a WACC for
384 Community of 7.15 percent which is close to the average recommended by Duff and
385 Phelps.

386 **IX. CONCLUSION**

387 **Q. WHAT IS THE DIVISION'S RECOMMENDATION FOR THIS PETITION?**

388 A. The Division recommends that the Commission use a 45 percent debt and 55 percent
389 equity hypothetical capital structure and an allowed rate-of-return of 7.15 percent and a
390 cost of equity of 10.22 percent.

391 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

392 A. Yes it does.